The essential aspects of the Transition can be formulated telegraphically. First of all, I went from a dictatorial system to a democratic one through an internal transformation of the Franco regime (“from law to law”). Second, the control by Francoist elites of the pace and scope of political change, in the midst of enormous mobilizations for change and under strong pressure from the army in the opposite direction. Third, a broad political consensus on nuclear issues once the first elections in 1977 confirmed a balance of forces between right and left (this consensus crystallized in the amnesty law, the La Moncloa Pacts, the 1978 Constitution and the creation of the autonomous state). Fourth, much of the transition was experienced with intense street conflicts, strong repression by the state and high levels of political violence by extremist groups of Basque nationalism, of the right and left, who did not accept the new rules of the game.
Of these aspects, consensus is the one that has reached a certain mythical category, replacing the whole with the part. For many the hallmark of the Transition are the great agreements, often remembered with a certain nostalgia. Consensus, however, coexisted, as just noted, with high levels of conflict and violence. Furthermore, not all political forces participated with equal enthusiasm. The political protagonists of the consensus were the UCD, the PSOE, the PCE and some nationalist parties. Alianza Popular (AP), parent company of the PP, opposed the legalization of the PCE, abstained on the amnesty law, did not vote in favor of the political agreement of the La Moncloa Pacts and seven of its 16 parliamentarians did not vote in favor of the Constitution. Ultimately, the consensus reigned for a relatively short period, between 1977 and 1979. In the first debate on the democratic investiture, on March 30, 1979, Adolfo Suárez announced that the consensus was over.
For Spaniards (CIS data), the transition is Spain’s most important event of the 20th century. It means the definitive normalization of the country, its homologation with the countries of Western Europe. The CIS has asked on several occasions what the level of pride is towards the Transition. In the first decades of democracy, around 90% felt proud. In 2018, however, the percentage had dropped to 75%, a sign that the agreement is no longer as strong as before. Furthermore, in the 1980s and 1990s there were almost no differences in age or ideology. In recent times, however, it has been found that appreciation of the Transition has decreased significantly among younger generations and among people who declare themselves more left-wing, while it has increased significantly among the far right (in 1985 only 63% of far-right people were proud of the Transition, in 2018 it was 83%).
These data seem to indicate that the vision of the Transition is subject to the same polarizing tensions as the rest of political issues. Little by little, two contrasting interpretations of our democratization have crystallized, one defensive and the other provocative. According to the first, the legacy of the Transition must be preserved as if it were a museum piece. Any initiative that goes beyond what was done then is perceived as an attack. In this vision, Spain’s ills originate when left-wing governments (those of Zapatero and Sánchez) break the original consensus. According to the second interpretation, the evils derive from the Transition itself, they are a consequence of the agreements reached then, which reflected the weakness of the left in the face of the right which had control of the State and great economic and media support.
The defensive vision is reluctant to change, the provocative one maintains that a different system must be built on new foundations. Given these approaches, it seems inevitable that the Transition will lose its original aura and be subjected to the political centrifugation typical of our times. In its most intransigent versions, the defensive vision (defended by PP and Vox, two parties that did not contribute to the success of the Transition) places the PSOE outside the 1978 Constitution, while the challenging vision considers the two large parties (PP and PSOE) as a burden that slows down an egalitarian transformation of the country.
It is possible to escape from these two opposing interpretations, which enjoy little consensus among public opinion. Instead of thinking of the Transition as a legacy to be preserved or destroyed, we can think of it as a set of values and practices that made inclusive democracy possible. From this point of view, the transition is still alive, since the process of building and deepening democracy never ends. This is the thesis that we defended with Robert Fishman in a recent book. For all its limitations, the transition was an exercise in political inclusion and mutual recognition between very distant political forces. In this sense, any initiative aimed at strengthening the functioning of the democratic system can be understood as a tribute to and a continuation of the most positive elements of the Transition. It is not a question of respecting the letter of the agreements reached at the time, but rather of gathering and promoting the spirit that animated these agreements.
