Official figures still promise growth in 2025, although not very large, but the reality of the Russian economy seems less encouraging. An article from independent Russian investigative media The Insider investigates rail freight traffic in Russia. The latter would collapse to levels unprecedented in the last two decades, exposing the fragility of an industrial apparatus exhausted by years of economic warfare. Behind the statistics announced by the Kremlin, the empty carriages on the national railway network depict a very different truth, namely an economy running out of steam.
Between January and September 2025, the volume of freight transported by Russian Railways fell by almost 7%, or the equivalent of 60 million tons. In fact, some 600,000 carriages were at a standstill – if placed end to end, they would form a line almost 8,400 kilometers long, enough to connect Moscow to the Pacific Ocean, the media explained. If this trend continues, 2025 will end with the lowest level of burden since 2003.
Insider’s investigation revealed major losses in twenty of the twenty-four major industry branches. Construction, metallurgy, automobiles and machine tools came to a standstill. Among the most affected cargo commodities, ferrous metals, construction materials and coal recorded double-digit declines. Only fertilizers and certain non-ferrous ores can escape the recession.
It’s not just about volume. The travel profile also changed: domestic shipments decreased while shipments to Asia increased slightly. The domestic market, once the engine of the economy, is seen contracting, while exports have become a means of survival for many sectors.
The end of the real estate bubble
For several years, the Russian government artificially supported development through subsidized mortgage loans. Four years and 2,500 billion rubles (approx. 26.5 million euros) later, bills are rising, but the cranes have stopped and we see a sudden decline in real estate credit: -33% for the volume lent, -44% for the amount loaned.
In the process, construction sites became scarce and fell by 16% (up to 32% around Moscow). Production of cement, concrete and ceramic materials has also decreased drastically. The rapid growth of the real estate sector in Russia did not end with a spectacular crash, but this key driver of domestic demand is slowly and relentlessly dying out.
The decline in transportation of oil and refined products, around -5%, can be directly linked to the attacks in Ukraine. In nine months, forty-five attacks hit twenty-two refineries and depots, reducing national capacity by 10 to 17%. The “maintenance work” mentioned by the railway authorities mainly serves to hide the impact of the war on the poorly protected energy infrastructure that has been targeted by Kiev for months.
The steel sector is in open crisis. Exports to European countries, once the main customers, are now hampered by sanctions. Volumes destined for China also fell by almost half, amid a global market saturated with excess Chinese production.
Coal is not improving either
The decline of the steel industry automatically leads to a decline in demand for coal, which is essential for steel production. Production fell 9%. The Ministry of Energy estimates the biggest losses in this sector, which are expected to reach 300 billion rubles (around 3 billion euros) this year – three times greater than in 2024. Mining regions in Siberia, especially Kuzbass, are experiencing a sluggish domestic market and a saturated railway network in the east.
Faced with these signals, the Central Bank continues to refuse to talk about a recession. Its president, Elvira Nabioullina, even insisted on a “excess demand” and in “too hot” economy. In fact, unemployment remains low and officials’ salaries are increasing. But this increase primarily reflected the mobilization and redirection of the state toward the war effort, not actual industrial dynamism.
Independent analysts are less optimistic. They saw the collapse of civilian production, masked by the growing burden of the military-industrial complex, which was ever present in official statistics. Behind promises of budgetary stability, Russia is undergoing structural change: It is investing less, producing less, and embracing a command economic system in which war serves as a recovery plan.
The Russian economy is not “excessive heat”as the Central Bank claims: it is running on empty, driven by closed-circuit military enthusiasm. In other words, Vladimir Putin really has no interest in stopping the war.
