When the Sudanese paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces (RSF) took place at the end of October the capital of the state of North Darfur, El Fasher, il testimonies of their atrocities They began to spread like wildfire: executions, sexual violence, torture, humiliation, kidnappings. The rebel forces had just subdued the last major city in western Sudan which remained under the control of the army and allied groups, thus cementing the division of the country into two blocs, in a civil war that in two and a half years caused tens of thousands of victims.
The cruelty shown to El Fasher and the growing partition of Sudan have once again shocked the international community. But, in addition to this global condemnation of RSF, it once again placed emphasis on the role of its main foreign ally, the United Arab Emirates, which, operating largely in the shadows, has provided unprecedented military and political support to the rebel group since the start of the Sudanese civil war (although Emirati authorities officially deny such intervention).
In the military sphere, Abu Dhabi authorities have articulated a complex and dynamic regional network of supply lines that is critical to fueling the rebel war machine. Shortly after the conflict erupted in April 2023, the Emirates began sending dozens of military cargo planes to Amdjarass, a remote town in eastern Chad near Darfur that is a stronghold of the Rapid Support Forces, according to flight trackers and a United Nations panel of experts. These planes often stopped in countries allied with the Emirates, especially in Uganda.
This early rotation of planes to Chad, which coincided with the granting of a multimillion-dollar loan from Abu Dhabi to Chadian President Mahamat Idriss Déby, came in parallel with the opening of three other smaller supply routes, including one for fuel, from the Central African Republic, Libya and South Sudan, all of which border Darfur, according to the UN panel.
The early shipment of weapons, fuel and vehicles was critical The Sudanese paramilitaries will be crushed they isolated army garrisons in Darfur and took control of every major city in the region except El Fasher in an offensive launched in the summer of 2023. In that campaign, the rebels deployed weapons they had never used before, such as drones, and which they soon displayed in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.
For months now this airlift has changed course. The main route currently passes through the remote Kufra airport in south-eastern Libya, also close to Darfur, which is controlled by the Libyan National Army (LNA) of the Jaftar family, another major ally of Abu Dhabi. An armed group within the LNA, Subul al Salam, and the Sudanese rebels, who have at least one base in the region, then handle much of the land transport.
Some of the Emirates planes landing in Kufra or Benghazi, another city in eastern Libya, stop in the city of Bosaso, located in the autonomous region of Puntland, Somalia, whose authorities have close relations with Abu Dhabi.
Rich Tedd, an analyst who monitors air traffic in the region, estimates that the average number of flights landing in eastern Libya from Al Reef and Al Ain military air bases in the Emirates, or through Bosaso airport, is around 60 per month. Between June and October, it says, it identified around 200 cargo flights heading from the Emirates to eastern Libya.
The Libyan supply line began to gain importance after the interruption of the Chad route. A second report by the UN group of experts attributes this to military and political pressure from the Zaghawa ethnic groups, present both in Darfur – where they are allies of the Sudanese army – and in eastern Chad, the home region of President Déby.
In addition to military supplies and fuel, the Emirates also directed the sending mercenaries in Darfur to support the Rapid Support Forces, as denounced by the Sudanese military government and documented by numerous media. Hundreds of these mercenaries are Colombian and were recruited by an Abu Dhabi-based company which then deployed them to western Sudan via eastern Libya, sometimes after crossing into the Emirates or Bosaso.
Impact forces and gold
The close relationship between the Dagalo family, which leads the Rapid Support Forces, and the Nahyan, the royal house of Abu Dhabi, dates back more than a decade, when the Emirates recruited thousands of Sudanese paramilitary fighters to fight the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen as part of a coalition led by Saudi Arabia.
The personal ties between the two families also reflect Emirati president Mohamed bin Zayed’s strategy since the 2011 Arab uprisings of supporting allies in the region, often non-state, who act as strike forces against what he perceives as two of his greatest threats: democratic and Islamic movements.
At the same time, the Dagalo family took advantage of its control over the RSF build a business empire which was active in multiple economic sectors before the war and which has since served to finance his war effort based in Dubai. Abu Dhabi also has important logistical and agricultural interests in Sudan.
Furthermore, since the beginning of the war, the income of the Rapid Support Forces has increasingly depended on them exploitation of goldwhich according to the Swiss NGO Swissaid is then exported mainly to Dubai via smuggling routes. Sudan’s military government, however, controls the country’s main gold-bearing areas and 98% of the gold it exported through official channels in 2024 also ended up in the Emirates, according to Central Bank data.
When questioned by EL PAÍS, an Emirati official “categorically” denied having provided support “of any kind to any of the warring parties since the beginning of the civil war” and condemned “the atrocities committed by both”. He also said Abu Dhabi supported “regional and international efforts to reach a ceasefire.” The official failed to clarify, however, the nature of Emirati air traffic in the region.
